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Abstract—We present Symbolic Quick Error Detection 
(Symbolic QED), a structured approach for logic bug detection and 
localization which can be used both during pre-silicon design 
verification as well as post-silicon validation and debug. This new 
methodology leverages prior work on Quick Error Detection (QED) 
which has been demonstrated to drastically reduce the latency, in 
terms of the number of clock cycles, of error detection following the 
activation of a logic (or electrical) bug. QED works through software 
transformations, including redundant execution and control flow 
checking, of the applied tests. Symbolic QED combines these error-
detecting QED transformations with bounded model checking-based 
formal analysis to generate minimal-length bug activation traces that 
detect and localize any logic bugs in the design.  
We demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of Symbolic QED 
using the OpenSPARC T2, a 500-million-transistor open-source 
multicore System-on-Chip (SoC) design, and using "difficult" logic bug 
scenarios observed in various state-of-the-art commercial multicore 
SoCs. Our results show that Symbolic QED: (i) is fully automatic, unlike 
manual techniques in use today that can be extremely time-consuming 
and expensive; (ii) requires only a few hours in contrast to manual 
approaches that might take days (or even months) or formal techniques 
that often take days or fail completely for large designs; and (iii) 
generates counter-examples (for activating and detecting logic bugs) that 
are up to 6 orders of magnitude shorter than those produced by 
traditional techniques. Significantly, this new approach does not 
require any additional hardware. 
Index Terms—Bounded Model Checking, Debug, Formal Debugging, 
Post-Silicon Validation and Debug, Quick Error Detection, QED, 
Symbolic Quick Error Detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ith the rapidly growing complexity of integrated circuits (ICs), 
critical design flaws (bugs) frequently escape pre-silicon 
verification, when the implemented design is checked to see if 
it meets defined specifications prior to the system being physically 
fabricated. As a result, there is an increasing dependence on post-
silicon validation of manufactured ICs in actual system environments 
to detect and fix these bugs. Design bugs can be broadly classified 
into: 
1. Logic bugs that are caused by (logic) design errors (including 
incorrect interactions between the hardware implementation and 
low-level system software, e.g. firmware); 
2. Electrical bugs that are caused by subtle, often non-
deterministic, interactions between a design and its “electrical” 
state. This paper focuses on logic bugs. 
Existing pre-silicon verification is inadequate for “difficult” 
logic bugs. Critical design bugs escape pre-silicon verification and 
are detected only during post-silicon validation [1-6]. Existing post-
silicon validation and bug localization practices are often manual and 
generally ad hoc, and their costs are rising faster than design costs [2, 
7-9]. These “difficult” bugs are, by definition, challenging to activate 
and detect during pre-silicon verification. In manufacturing test, well-
established test coverage metrics (e.g. single-stuck-at coverage, 
transition fault coverage) exist. These metrics have been 
experimentally shown to be effective in detecting manufacturing 
defects. Metrics such as code coverage and assertion coverage are 
used during pre-silicon verification, but are less standardized. For 
post-silicon validation, coverage metrics are in their infancy and are 
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highly challenging (partially due to very limited controllability and 
observability with “traditional” post-silicon validation). 
Following error detection, post-silicon bug localization involves 
identifying a bug trace (defined as a sequence of inputs, e.g., 
instructions that activate and detect the bug) and the hardware design 
block (possibly) containing the bug. The effort to localize bugs from 
observed system failures (e.g., deadlocks, crashes, output errors) 
dominates the overall cost of post-silicon validation and debug [2, 4, 
8, 10]. For example, it might take days or weeks (or even months) of 
(manual) work to localize and debug a single logic bug [4, 11]. New 
techniques are needed to reverse this trend. 
Post-silicon bug localization challenges are primarily caused by 
long error detection latencies [12-15].  Error detection latency is the 
time elapsed between when a test activates a bug and creates an error 
and when the error manifests as an observable failure (e.g., system 
crash, timeout, deadlock, exception). Error detection latencies for 
“difficult” bugs can exceed several millions or even billions of clock 
cycles where the error remains latent and does not affect an observed 
signal [13, 14]. It is extremely difficult to trace that far back into the 
history of system operation, especially for large designs consisting of 
multiple cores, cache / memory controllers, etc. 
Traditional post-silicon validation and debug techniques often 
rely on trace buffers to generate bug traces. Trace buffers are small 
memories that record the logic values of a selected set of signals.  
Typically, trace buffers can record only a few (~1,000) clock cycles 
of history (or a longer history at the cost of recording fewer signals) 
[7, 16, 17]. However, when dealing with extremely long error 
detection latencies (especially for multi-core chips with many signals 
to record), trace buffer techniques can quickly become ineffective.  
Assertions can also be used for post-silicon debug. However, 
manual assertion creation is difficult, and it is even more challenging 
to create assertions that can be efficiently implemented in hardware. 
Although reconfigurable logic has been shown to reduce the 
implementation burden [7], selecting the “right” set of assertions to 
include remains a major problem. This issue is a significant challenge 
facing automatic assertion generation [18-21], which can see an 
explosion in the number of assertions, many of which are ineffective 
at catching bugs. 
Many existing bug localization practices rely on failure 
reproduction, which involves returning the system to an error-free 
state and re-executing the failure-causing stimuli.  As explained in 
[16, 22], failure reproduction is very difficult for complex ICs due to 
non-deterministic behaviors, such as interrupts, I/O functionalities, 
interactions between multiple processor cores, and operating system 
functionalities (e.g., context switches). The sheer design size also 
poses major challenges. System-level simulations are several orders 
of magnitude slower than actual silicon [1, 4, 23]. The use of formal 
analysis and Boolean Satisfiability techniques for post-silicon 
validation and debug (e.g., [16, 24, 25]) can also be severely limited 
by design size (as we also show in Sec. IV). 
Symbolic Quick Error Detection (Symbolic QED) is motivated 
by the urgent need for a structured, automated, and scalable approach 
to overcome post-silicon bug localization challenges. However, since 
it only requires the design RTL, it is also directly applicable for 
detecting and localizing logic bugs during pre-silicon verification (we 
introduce an important post-silicon application in Sec. IV.D to detect 
bugs that escape pre-silicon). Key characteristics of Symbolic QED 
are: 1) It is applicable to any System-on-Chip (SoC) design 
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containing at least one programmable processor core (a generally 
valid assumption for existing SoCs [3]); 2) It is broadly applicable for 
logic bugs inside processor cores, accelerators, and uncore 
components;1 3) It doesn't require failure reproduction; 4) It doesn't 
require human intervention during bug localization; 5) It doesn't 
require additional hardware to localize logic bugs. However, small 
hardware blocks called change detectors can improve localization 
during post-silicon validation and debug; and, 6) It doesn’t require 
design-specific assertions. 
We demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of Symbolic 
QED by showing that: 1) Symbolic QED correctly and automatically 
localizes difficult logic bugs in a few hours (less than 7) for 
OpenSPARC T2, a 500-million-transistor open-source SoC (see Sec. 
IV). Such bugs would generally take days or weeks (or even months) 
of manual work to localize using traditional approaches; 2) Symbolic 
QED does not require additional hardware (such as trace buffers) for 
localizing logic bugs; 3) For each detected logic bug, Symbolic QED 
provides a small list of candidate components representing the 
possible locations of the bug in the design; 4) For each detected logic 
bug, Symbolic QED automatically generates a minimal-length bug 
trace using formal analysis; 5) Bug traces generated by Symbolic 
QED are up to 6 orders of magnitude shorter than those produced by 
traditional techniques; and, 6) while Symbolic QED is motivated in 
the context of post-silicon validation and debug, it does not require 
any actual tests run on silicon, making it applicable to pre-silicon 
design verification. 
Our first paper [26] introduced the Symbolic QED methodology 
using the EDDI-V and PLC QED transforms, and demonstrated its 
effectiveness using “difficult” bug scenarios abstracted from the bug 
databases of commercial multi-core SoCs. This paper builds on that 
work in the following ways: 
1. We extend Symbolic QED to more QED transformations: 
Control Flow Checking using Software Signatures for 
Validation (CFCSS-V), and Control Flow Tracking using 
Software Signatures for Validation (CFTSS-V). 
2. We expand on the results from [26] to include control flow 
bugs, including an example causing a deadlock. 
3. We provide more detailed analysis and discussions on how 
Symbolic QED handles large designs, difficult bugs that feature 
system interrupts, and bugs that would otherwise require locks 
but do not with our approach. 
4. We demonstrate how Symbolic QED can be used during post-
silicon validation to detect and localize bugs (undetected in pre-
silicon) with very long activation sequences that require a 
specific BMC starting state, when combined with QED tests.  
A. Motivating Example 
We present a bug scenario that corresponds to a difficult bug 
found during post-silicon validation of a commercial multicore SoC:  
Two stores within 2 cycles to adjacent cache lines delay the next 
cache coherence message received by that cache by 5 clock cycles. 
The bug is only activated when two store operations to adjacent 
cache lines occur within 2 clock cycles of each other.  The next cache 
coherence message (e.g., invalidation) is delayed because of a delay 
in the receive buffer of the cache (these details were not known before 
the bug was found and localized). During post-silicon validation, a 
test running on the SoC created a deadlock. As shown in Fig. 1, the 
deadlock occurred because one of the processor cores (core 4) 
performed a store to memory location [A] followed by a store to 
memory location [B] within 2 cycles ([A] and [B] were cached on 
adjacent cache lines). As a result, the bug was activated in cache 4.  
 
Figure 1. Example bug scenario. 
 
1 Uncore components refer to components in an SoC that are neither processor cores nor 
co-processors. Examples include interconnect fabrics, and cache / memory controllers. 
After the bug was activated, processor core 1 performed a store 
to memory location [C]. Since memory location [C] was cached in 
multiple caches (cache 1 and cache 4), the store operation to memory 
location [C] had to invalidate other cached copies of memory location 
[C] (including the cached copy in cache 4).   However, due to the bug, 
the invalidation message received by cache 4 was delayed by 5 clock 
cycles. Before the invalidation occurred, processor core 4 loaded 
from memory location [C]. Since the cached copy of memory location 
[C] in cache 4 was still marked as valid, it loaded a stale copy (which 
contained the wrong value at that point).  Then, millions of clock 
cycles later, processor core 4 used the wrong value of memory 
location [C] in code that performed locking, resulting in a deadlock.  
When such a deadlock is detected (e.g., by using a timeout), the 
bug must be localized by identifying the bug trace and the component 
where the bug is located. Since it is not known a priori when the bug 
was activated or when the system deadlocked, it can be very difficult 
to obtain the bug trace. Additionally, the bug trace can be extremely 
long due to the long error detection latency, containing extraneous 
instructions that are not needed for activating or detecting the bug.  
As discussed above, such bugs are extremely challenging to localize 
using approaches such as trace buffers, failure reproduction, 
simulation, or traditional formal methods. 
As shown in Sec. IV, Symbolic QED correctly localizes this bug 
to cache 4 and produces a bug trace that is only 3 instructions long. 
Symbolic QED takes only 2.5 hours to automatically localize this bug 
without requiring any failure reproduction, or any additional 
hardware. This is possible because Symbolic QED uses bounded 
model checking (BMC), which finds the minimal bug trace, if one 
exists [27] (details in Sec. III). Additionally, Symbolic QED employs 
special “design reduction” techniques to effectively handle large 
multi-core SoC designs such as the OpenSPARC T2 SoC (details in 
Sec. III). In contrast, traditional post-silicon bug localization 
approaches would likely require manual effort, additional hardware 
(e.g., trace buffers), or both, and could take days or weeks (or even 
months). Furthermore, the bug traces found by traditional post-silicon 
techniques can be significantly longer than those found by Symbolic 
QED (empirically demonstrated in Sec. IV).  
While the motivation and main focus of this paper is post-silicon 
bug localization, the Symbolic QED technique can also be used for 
logic bug detection and localization during pre-silicon verification, as 
well as emulation-based verification, without significant changes. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II provides an 
overview of the previously-published Quick Error Detection (QED) 
technique.  Sec. III presents the Symbolic QED technique. Results are 
presented in Sec. IV, followed by related work in Sec. V.  We 
conclude in Sec. VI, with supplemental materials in the appendices. 
II. BACKGROUND: QUICK ERROR DETECTION (QED) 
 QED tests have been demonstrated to be highly effective for 
quickly detecting logic and electrical bugs inside processor cores, 
uncore components, accelerators, and components related to power-
management features [12-15, 28]. The software-only QED technique 
automatically transforms post-silicon validation tests (original tests) 
into new QED tests using various QED transformations, e.g., Error 
Detection using Duplicated Instructions for Validation (EDDI-V), 
Proactive Load and Check (PLC), Control Flow Checking using 
Software Signatures for Validation (CFCSS-V), and Control Flow 
Tracking using Software Signatures for Validation (CFTSS-V). 
A. EDDI-V 
EDDI-V [12, 14] targets bugs inside processor cores by 
frequently checking the results of original instructions against the 
results of duplicated instructions created by EDDI-V. First, the 
registers and memory space are divided into two halves,2 one for the 
original instructions and one for the duplicated instructions. Next, 
corresponding registers and memory locations for the original and the 
duplicated instructions are initialized to the same values. Then, for 
every load, store, arithmetic, logical, shift, or move instruction in the 
original test, EDDI-V creates a corresponding duplicate instruction 
2 For EDDI-V, if it is not possible to divide the registers into two halves (e.g., if the 
original test needs to use all of the available registers), we can use memory to store the 
register values. The details are in [Lin 14]. 
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that performs the same operation, but on the registers and memory 
reserved for the duplicate instructions. The duplicated instructions 
execute in the same order as the original instructions.  
The EDDI-V transformation also inserts periodic check 
instructions (referred to as Normal checks in this paper) that compare 
the results of the original instructions against those of the duplicated 
instructions. For every duplicated load instruction, an additional Load 
check instruction is inserted immediately after (before the loaded 
values are used by any other instructions) to check that the value 
loaded by the original instruction matches the value loaded by the 
corresponding duplicated instruction. Similarly, for store 
instructions, a Store check instruction is inserted immediately before 
the original store instruction to check that the value about to be stored 
by the original instruction matches the value about to be stored by the 
duplicated instruction.  Each check instruction is of the form: 
CMP Ra, Ra’ , 
where Ra and Ra’ are the original and (corresponding) duplicate 
registers, respectively. A mismatch in any check instruction indicates 
an error. To minimize any intrusiveness [13, 14, 15] that might 
prevent bug detection by QED, insertion of the duplicated 
instructions and the check instructions is controlled by the parameters 
Inst_min and Inst_max, the minimum (maximum) number of original 
instructions that must (can) execute before any duplicated or check 
instructions. 
B. PLC 
PLC targets bugs inside uncore components by frequently and 
proactively performing loads from memory (through those uncore 
components) and checking the values loaded. Starting with an EDDI-
V-transformed QED test, PLC inserts Proactive Load and Check 
operations (PLC operations) throughout the transformed test, which 
runs on all cores and all threads. In Fig. 3(a), a segment of code has 
been transformed with PLC operations, with the PLC operation 
detailed in Fig. 3(b). Each PLC operation checks the values in 
memory for a selected set of variables (PLC list). For each selected 
variable, a PLC operation loads the value from the memory reserved 
for original instructions (address A) and the value from the 
corresponding memory reserved for duplicated instructions (address 
A’).  Any mismatch during the PLC check (CMP Rt, Rt’) indicates an 
error. Note that locks must be used if the variable is shared between 
multiple cores / threads or if there are sources of non-determinism in 
the system (e.g., interrupts, I/O, or OS functionalities such as context 
switches). Several PLC strategies are discussed in [13, 14, 15]. 
C. CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V 
Control Flow Checking using Software Signatures for 
Validation (CFCSS-V) and Control Flow Tracking using Software 
Signatures for Validation (CFTSS-V) are two QED transformations 
that target bugs that affect a processor core’s control flow [14].  
//initialization 
R1  = 1 
R2  = 2 
R3  = 3 
R4  = 4 
R5  = 5 
R6  = 6 
//code 
R1 = R2 + R3 
R4 = R5 – R6 
R4 = R1 – R4 
B label 
 
 
     
 
 
  
//initialization 
R1  = 1   R17  = 1 
R2  = 2   R18  = 2 
R3  = 3   R19  = 3 
R4  = 4   R20  = 4 
R5  = 5   R21  = 5 
R6  = 6   R22  = 6 
//code 
R1  = R2  + R3 
R4  = R5  – R6 
R4  = R1  – R4 
R17 = R18 + R19 
R20 = R21 – R22 
R20 = R17 – R20 
CMP R4, R20 
BNE ERROR_DETECTED 
B label 
Figure 2. EDDI-V transformation, with Inst_min = Inst_max = 3. 
    Transformed Code          PLC Operation 
      ... 
<PLC Operation> 
R1  = R2  + R3 
R4  = R5  – R6 
R17 = R18 + R19 
R20 = R21 – R22 
<PLC Operation> 
R7  = R1  – R4 
R9  = R7  * R8 
R23 = R17 – R20 
R25 = R23 * R24 
<PLC Operation> 
        ... 
 
 
for <A,A’> in PLC_list do 
  LOCK(A) 
  LOCK(A’) 
  Rt  = LOAD(A) 
  Rt’ = LOAD(A’) 
  UNLOCK(A’) 
  UNLOCK(A’) 
  CMP Rt, Rt’ 
  BNE ERROR_DETECTED 
end for 
       
Figure 3. PLC example with Inst_min = Inst_max = 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. (a) An example sequence of instructions, and (b) the 
corresponding control flow graph. The dashed arrow represents an 
incorrect control flow transition from block_2 to block_4. 
 
if ((signature == block_1_sigature) or (signature == block_3_signature)) 
then 
   signature = block_4_signature // update signature 
else 
   ERROR DETECTED 
end if 
Figure 5. Pseudo code for <CFCSS-V check 4>. 
 
ST [TEMP_VARIABLE], R1 
LI R1, SOFTWARE_SIGNATURE 
ST [CFTSS_V_SIGNATURE], R1 
LD R1, [TEMP_VARIABLE] 
Figure 6. Pseudo assembly code for the CFTSS-V operation inserted at 
the beginning of each “block of instructions”. 
Consider a sequence of instructions shown in Fig. 4(a), and the 
corresponding control flow graph (Fig. 4(b)).  A CFCSS-V check 
block is inserted at the beginning of each block of instructions.  The 
pseudo code for <CFCSS-V check 4> is shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 5, 
block_1_signature, block_3_signature, and block_4_signature are the 
unique software signatures for each block.  When the control flow 
transitions from one block to another, the CFCSS-V check block is 
executed first (before any other instructions in the block).  In the case 
of block_4, <CFCSS-V check 4> checks to see if the signature 
variable (which contains the software signature of the last block of 
instructions executed) is equal to either block_1_signature or 
block_3_signature (since these are the only two blocks that may 
execute immediately before block_4).   
CFTSS-V is a variant of CFCSS-V that tracks the execution of 
instructions using special software signatures inserted into the test 
code, but does not perform control flow checking.  We first declare a 
global variable CFTSS_V_SIGNATURE that holds the current 
runtime signatures of the program.  Next, the instructions in the test 
are divided into “blocks of instructions” as determined by the QED 
transformation parameters Inst_min and Inst_max.  A unique integer 
(i.e., software signature) is assigned to each “block of instructions” 
[29-31]. Fig. 6 lists the pseudo assembly code for the CFTSS-V 
operation.  In Fig. 6, [TEMP_VARIABLE] is a designated memory 
location used to store the saved value of R1.  It ensures the CFTSS-
V transformation does not alter the value of the registers in the 
original test. SOFTWARE_SIGNATURE is the unique software 
signature assigned to the “block of instructions” using the algorithm 
found in [30], and [CFTSS_V_SIGNATURE] is the designated 
memory location to hold the current runtime signature of the test.  
When a failure occurs (e.g., livelock or deadlock) the content of 
[CFTSS_V_SIGNATURE] is used to find the last “block of 
instructions” executed by the processor core before the failure. 
III. SYMBOLIC QED 
Symbolic QED detects and localizes bugs, and produces short 
bug traces consisting of only a few instructions (often less than 10) 
automatically. Within the space of QED-compatible bug traces 
(explained below), the traces produced by Symbolic QED are 
minimal, meaning no shorter bug traces exist. These short bug traces 
make bugs easier to understand and fix. 
The Symbolic QED approach presented in this paper relies on 
bounded model checking (BMC), a technique used in formal 
verification. Given a model of a system (e.g., the RTL) and a property 
to be checked (e.g., a check inserted by QED), the system is formally 
analyzed to see if the property can be violated in a bounded number 
of steps (clock cycles).  If so, a counter-example (a concrete trace 
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violating the property, i.e., a bug trace) is produced. BMC guarantees 
that if a counter-example is found, it is a minimal-length counter-
example [27]. We first review three challenges associated with using 
BMC for post-silicon bug localization: 1) BMC needs a property to 
check. Since the bugs are not known a priori, it is difficult to craft 
such properties (and avoid false positives); 2) Large design sizes limit 
the effectiveness of BMC.  If a design is too large, a typical BMC tool 
will not even be able to load the design (see Sec. IV).  Even if a large 
design can be loaded, running BMC on it is likely to be very slow; 
and, 3) the performance of BMC techniques is affected by the number 
of cycles required to trigger and observe a bug. As the number of 
cycles increases, BMC performance slows down, especially for large 
designs.  Thus, unless a short counter-example exists, BMC will take 
too long or will be unable to find it. 
We address challenge (2) in Sec. III.E. Here, we focus on 
challenges (1) and (3).  The key idea is to create a BMC problem that 
searches through all possible QED tests (for a given set of QED 
transformations).  As shown in [12, 13, 14, 15], QED tests are 
excellent for detecting a wide variety of bugs; hence, we use QED 
checks (i.e., Normal checks, Load checks, Store checks, and PLC 
checks) as the properties, thus addressing challenge (1). QED tests 
are also designed to detect errors quickly. By searching all possible 
QED tests using the minimality guarantees of BMC, it is usually 
possible to find a very short trace triggering the bug, addressing 
challenge (3). The details of Symbolic QED using the EDDI-V and 
PLC QED tests are explained in the following subsections, followed 
by an extension of the methodology to CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V. 
A. Solving for QED-Compatible Bug Traces Using BMC 
For EDDI-V and PLC transformations, QED tests provide very 
succinct properties to check using check instructions of the form: 
CMP Ra, Ra’. 
For PLC checks and Load checks, Ra and Ra’ hold values loaded 
from uncore components; for Normal checks and Store checks, Ra 
and Ra’ hold the results of computations executed on the cores. An 
error is detected when the two registers are not equal. Thus, we use 
BMC to find counter-examples to properties of the form: 
Ra==Ra’, 
where Ra is an original register and Ra’ is the corresponding 
duplicated register. However, without additional constraints, the 
BMC engine will find trivial counter-examples that do not correspond 
to real bugs.  For example, the instruction sequence {MOV R11, 
MOV R17 2, CMP R1, R17} results in R1≠R17; the inequality is 
not caused by a bug. In order to avoid such situations, we require that 
counter-examples must be QED-compatible. We define a QED-
compatible bug trace as a sequence of inputs with the following 
properties:  
1. Inputs must be valid instructions. Specifications of valid 
instructions can be directly obtained from the Instruction Set 
Architecture (ISA) of the processor cores.  
2. The registers and memory space are divided into two halves: 
one for “original” instructions and one for “duplicated” instructions. 
For every instruction (excluding control-flow changing instructions) 
that operates on the registers and memory space allocated for the 
original instructions, there exists a corresponding duplicated 
instruction that performs the same operation, but operates on the 
registers and memory space allocated for the duplicated instructions. 
3. The sequence of original instructions and the sequence of 
duplicated instructions must execute in the same order. 
4. The comparison (i.e., the property checked by the BMC tool) 
between an original register R and its corresponding register R’ 
occurs only if the original and its corresponding duplicate instructions 
have both been executed. 
To find a bug trace using BMC, Symbolic QED requires three 
inputs described in the next sections: the design RTL with a QED 
module (III.B), an initial state (III.C) and a QED-based property to 
check (III.D and III.E). 
 
3  One could alternatively use a pseudo-instruction “QED” to trigger instruction 
duplication; the processor would treat this instruction as a NOP. This would allow the QED 
module to create sequences that would not be possible otherwise (e.g., an odd number of 
 
Figure 7. A timeline illustrating situations where PLC on variable X 
does not result in false fail. 
B. QED Module 
Ensuring that only QED-compatible bug traces are considered 
by BMC requires constraining the inputs to the design. We 
accomplish this by adding a new QED module to the fetch stage of 
each processor core during BMC. The QED module is only used 
within the BMC tool and is not added to the manufactured IC; 
i.e., there is no performance/area/power overhead. The QED module 
only needs to be designed once for a given ISA, and made available 
as a “library component” for use during validation. The design of a 
QED module is simple, and can be tested in only a few minutes (see 
Sec. IV). Note that, although the QED module is added to processor 
cores, Symbolic QED is effective not only for bugs inside processor 
cores, but also for bugs in uncore components, as well as bugs related 
to power-management features (as demonstrated in Sec. IV). 
The QED module automatically transforms a sequence of original 
instructions into a QED-compatible sequence. Any control-flow altering 
instruction determines the end of the “sequence of original instructions.”3 
The QED module only requires that this sequence is made up of valid 
instructions and that they read from or write to only the registers and 
memory allocated for the original instructions (conditions that can be 
specified directly to the BMC tool). The sequence of original instructions 
is first executed unmodified (up to but not including the control-flow 
instruction), and the instructions are committed. Then, it is executed a 
second time, but instead of using the original registers and memory, the 
instructions are modified to use the registers and memory allocated for 
the duplicated instructions. Since duplication is triggered only by a 
control-flow instruction, the QED module does not use a fixed value for 
Inst_min and Inst_max. Instead, (by design) the BMC tool considers 
counter-examples (in this case, sequences of original instructions) 
starting with smaller sequences and then moving to longer sequences 
[27]. This allows the BMC tool to implicitly (and simultaneously) 
search through a wide variety of instruction sequences of increasing 
lengths in order to find a bug trace. After the second execution, a signal 
is asserted to indicate that the original and corresponding duplicated 
registers should contain the same values under bug-free situations, i.e., 
the BMC tool should check the property Ra == Ra’. 
Note that, because the BMC tool can choose a wide variety of 
instructions as input to the QED module (including loads and stores), 
it can effectively create checks that could be generated by a QED 
transformation, including Normal, Load, Store, and PLC checks.  
Also note that a PLC check generated by the QED module does not 
require locks. To see why locks are not needed, we can consider PLC 
on a variable X as composed of 4 events:  
1) Store to the variable X by processor core A,  
2) Load from the variable X by a processor core B,  
3) Store to the corresponding duplicated variable X’ by 
processor core A, and, 
4) Load from the corresponding duplicated variable X’ by 
processor core B.   
Note that, multiple processor cores may load from X and X’. In 
order to guarantee there are no false fails, we need to ensure either 
one of two situations occur: 
Situation 1: If event 1 occurs before event 2, then event 3 must 
occur before event 4;  
Situation 2: If event 1 occurs after event 2, then event 3 must 
occur after event 4. 
instructions between two control-flow altering instructions, such as {BRANCH; ADD; 
BRANCH}). 
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Figure 8. The QED module interface. 
 
This means that event 3 and event 4 occur in the same order as 
that of event 1 and event 2. Figure 7 illustrates these two situations. 
Symbolic QED guarantees that only situation 1 or situation 2 will 
occur.  To see why, first, we note that the QED module guarantees 
that the duplicated sequence of instructions always executes in the 
same order as that of the original sequence of instructions4. Therefore, 
the only way that event 3 and event 4 (i.e., store to and load from 
duplicated variable X’) will occur in a different order than event 1 
and event 2 is if there are delays in executing the duplicated sequence 
of instructions (by either processor core A or B). For example, in 
situation 1, if processor core A delays executing the store to the 
duplicated variable X’ until after the load from duplicated variable X’ 
on processor core B.  However, there cannot be any delays because: 
1) All of the processor cores start executing the duplicated 
sequence of instructions at the same clock cycle. This is because we 
wait until the original instructions are committed before executing the 
duplicated instructions on the same clock cycle.  Since the original 
instructions have committed, no instructions remain in the pipeline 
that would delay the duplicated instructions, and therefore, the 
duplicated instructions are guaranteed to start executing on the same 
clock cycle.   
2) The execution of the instructions is deterministic. Therefore, 
all instructions will complete in a deterministic amount of time (e.g., 
there are no delays due to context switches). 
As a result, Symbolic QED guarantees that PLC will not result 
in false fails even without locks. This is effective even if there are 
multiple processor cores loading from variables X and X’.  This is 
because we ensure that all processor cores start executing the 
duplicated sequence of instructions on the same clock cycle. As a 
result, the order in which event 3 and event 4 occur will always be the 
same as the order in which event 1 and event 2 occurred.  
Figure 8 shows how the QED module integrates with the fetch unit. 
The pseudo code of the QED module is shown in Fig. 9.  The inputs to the 
QED module are: 1) enable, which disables the QED module if 0 (this 
signal can be set by the validation engineers to disable the QED module); 
 
INPUT: enable, current_instruction, next_instruction, next_PC, target_address,  
             pipeline_empty 
OUTPUT: PC, PC_override, instruction_out, instruction_override,  qed_ready 
// initialization 
mode  ORIG; // “mode” is shared by all QED modules 
rewind_address  PC obtained from initial state (Sec. III.C);  
qed_ready  false;   PC_override_i  0;        instruction_override_i  0; 
// end initialization 
PC_override   enable ? PC_override_i : 0; 
instruction_override  enable ? instruction_override_i : 0; 
if mode == CHECK then 
  mode   ORIG;                                              qed_ready  true; 
  PC  target_address;                                    PC_override_i  1;  
  rewind_address  target_address; 
end if 
if mode == ORIG, then 
  qed_ready  false;  instruction_override_i  0; PC_override_i  0; 
  if is_control_flow_instruction(next_instruction) then 
    mode  WAIT1; // all QED modules go to “WAIT1” when any QED       
                                // module gets a control-flow instruction 
  end if 
end if 
if mode == WAIT1 then // wait until pipelines of all processor cores are empty 
  mode  pipeline_empty ? DUP : WAIT1;        qed_ready  false; 
  instruction_out  NOP;                                    instruction_override_i  1; 
  PC  rewind_address;                                     PC_override_i  1; 
end if 
if mode == DUP then 
  qed_ready  false;    rewind_address  next_PC;   PC_override_i  0; 
  if is_control_flow_instruction(next_instruction) then 
    mode  WAIT2; // all QED modules go to “WAIT2” when any QED  
                               // module gets a control-flow instruction 
  end if  
  instruction_out  create_duplicated_version(current_instruction); 
  instruction_override_i  1; 
end if 
if mode== WAIT2 then // wait until pipelines of all processor cores are empty 
  mode  pipeline_empty ? CHECK : WAIT2;   qed_ready  false; 
  instruction_out  NOP;                                    instruction_override_i  1; 
  PC  rewind_address;                                     PC_override_i  1; 
end if 
Figure 9. Pseudo code for QED module. 
 
4 This is because (as explained later) for the duplicated execution, the QED 
module modifies the operands of the original sequence of instructions such that 
2) current_instruction, which is the current instruction to be executed in 
the pipeline of the processor core; 3) next_instruction, which is the next 
sequential instruction after current_instruction (i.e., the instruction to be 
fetched by the fetch unit after current_instruction); 4) next_PC, which is 
the PC corresponding to next_instruction; 5) target_address, which is 
equivalent to next_PC unless the current instruction is a control-flow 
instruction, in which case it is the control-flow instruction’s target address; 
and 6) pipeline_empty, which is a signal that is true if and only if there are 
no instructions in the pipelines of any of the processor cores and all 
executed instructions on all cores have been committed (i.e., the results 
written to registers or to memory). 
The outputs from the QED module are: 1) PC, which is used to 
override the value of next_PC; 2) PC_override, which determines if the 
processor core should use the PC from the QED module or next_PC 
from the fetch unit; 3) instruction_out, which is used to override the 
value of current_instruction; 4) instruction_override, which determines 
whether the processor core should use the modified instruction 
(instruction_out) from the QED module or current_instruction; and 5) 
qed_ready, which signals when both original and duplicated registers 
should have the same values (under bug-free conditions). qed_ready is 
false initially; it is only set to true when both original and duplicated 
instructions have committed. 
The QED module has internal variables: 1) mode, which tracks if 
the processor core is executing original instructions (ORIG), duplicated 
instructions (DUP), in a wait mode (WAIT1 or WAIT2), or if the BMC 
tool should do a check (CHECK). This variable is shared by all of the 
QED modules in the design so that they are always in the same mode; 
2) rewind_address, which holds the address of the first instruction in 
the sequence of original instructions, (initialized to PC obtained from 
the initial state in Sec. III.C); 3) PC_override_i and 4) 
instruction_override_i, which are internal versions of PC_override and 
instruction_override (the only difference is that when the enable is set 
to 0, then both PC_override and instruction_override are also set to 0, 
disabling the QED module). The QED modules start in ORIG mode. 
When next_instruction is a control-flow altering instruction, all QED 
modules go to WAIT1. In WAIT1, PC is set to rewind_address, and 
PC_override_i is set to 1 (if enable is 1, PC_override is also set to 1). The 
QED module also outputs NOP on instruction_out and sets 
instruction_override_i to 1 (if enable is 1, instruction_override is also set 
to 1). The QED modules stay in WAIT1 until all of the original instructions 
have committed (when pipeline_empty becomes true, i.e., all processor 
core pipelines are empty). Then, all QED modules switch to DUP, and each 
processor core then re-executes instructions starting from the address stored 
in rewind_address. In DUP, the duplicated instruction is produced on 
instruction_out, and instruction_override_i is set to 1, so the core executes 
the duplicated instruction instead of the original instruction from the fetch 
unit. In DUP, rewind_address is constantly updated to next_PC. 
Then, when next_instruction is a control-flow altering instruction, all 
QED modules switch to WAIT2 and stay in WAIT2 until the duplicated 
instructions on all processor cores have committed (the pipeline_empty 
signal becomes true, i.e., the pipelines of all processor cores are empty). In 
WAIT2, PC is set to rewind_address. The QED module also outputs NOP 
on instruction_out and sets instruction_override_i to 1 (if enable is 1, 
instruction_override is also set to 1). After the instructions have committed, 
the original and corresponding duplicated registers should be equal. Then, 
the QED modules switch to CHECK. In CHECK, qed_ready is set to true. 
Each QED module also updates rewind_address to target_address (i.e., the 
address of the next instruction to execute) and sets PC to target_address 
and PC_override_i to 1. After CHECK, the QED modules return to ORIG. 
An example of the transformation performed by the QED module 
is shown in Fig. 10. Note that, LOAD(A) is transformed into LOAD(A’) 
during the second execution. Thus, comparing the registers (using the 
BMC tool) is equivalent to a PLC check on variables A and A’. There 
are 4 events here: (1) store to A by core 1, (2) load from A by core 2, (3) 
store to A’ by core 1, and (4) load from A’ by core 2.  
they operate on registers and memory reserved for the duplicated sequence of 
instructions (the order of the instructions is preserved). 
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Figure 10. Example of QED transformation by the QED module. (a) A 
sequence of original instructions on core 1 and core 2, and (b) the actual 
transformed instructions executed by the cores. 
 
As explained earlier in this Section, to avoid false fails without 
using locks, the QED module ensures that the order of (3) and (4) is the 
same as the order of (1) and (2), even if multiple cores load from A and 
A’. Because the BMC tool can choose a wide variety of instructions for 
the original sequence of instructions, this does not significantly affect 
the ability of Symbolic QED to activate and find bugs in general (which 
is empirically demonstrated in Sec. IV). However, in future work, one 
may want to allow the processor cores to have more freedom when 
executing the duplicated instructions; in that case, locks may be 
necessary. Memory initialization is discussed in Sec. III.C. 
C. Initial State  
The approach outlined above ensures that only QED-compatible 
traces are considered by BMC.  However, the initial state for the 
BMC run must be a QED-consistent state, in which the value of each 
register (in the processor core) and memory location allocated for 
original instructions must match the corresponding register or 
memory location for duplicated instructions.  This is to ensure that no 
false counter-examples are generated. One approach would be to start 
the processor from its reset state.  However, the reset state may not 
be QED-consistent (or it may be difficult to confirm whether it is). 
Some designs also go through a reset sequence that may span several 
clock cycles, making the BMC problem more difficult. For example, 
for OpenSPARC T2, only one processor core is active after a reset, 
and the system executes a sequence of initialization instructions 
(approximately 600 clock cycles long) to activate other processor 
cores in the system.  
It is advantageous to start from a QED-consistent state after the 
system has executed the reset sequence (if any) to improve the runtime 
of BMC (also demonstrated by results in Sec. IV). A simple way to obtain 
a QED-consistent state is to run “some” QED test (independent of 
specific tests for bug detection and debug) in simulation and to stop 
immediately after QED checks have compared all of the register and 
memory values (this ensures that each “original” register or memory 
location has the same value as its corresponding “duplicate” register or 
memory location). This can be accomplished with a simple (short) test 
that just writes to the original and corresponding duplicated registers and 
memory locations and checks them to ensure that they are in a QED-
consistent state. The register values (including the PC and next_PC from 
Sec. III.B) and memory values are read out of the simulator and then used 
to set the register values, PC, next_PC, and memory values of the design 
when preparing to run BMC.  If the design contains multiple processor 
cores, the processor cores can be simulated together. Alternatively, each 
core can be simulated independently and the results merged together to 
set up the BMC run. In this case, some care must be taken to ensure that 
the values in shared memory locations are the same at the end of each 
simulation (e.g. by running the same test on each core). One can obtain 
these values using ultra-fast simulators (at a higher level of abstraction 
than RTL) that can simulate large designs with thousands of processor 
cores [32]. Thus, this initialization step does not affect the scalability of 
Symbolic QED.  
It is possible that some bugs may not be detected from a generic 
QED-consistent initial state as they require a very long activation 
sequence. We target these bugs during post-silicon validation by 
leveraging QED tests, as presented in Sec. IV.D. 
D. Finding Counter-Examples using BMC 
After inserting the QED module and setting the initial state, we 
use BMC to find a counter-example to the property: 
𝑞𝑒𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦  ⋀ 𝑅𝑎 == 𝑅𝑎′𝑎∈{0..𝑛
2
−1} , 
where n is the number of registers defined by the ISA. Here (for 𝑎 ∈
{0. . 𝑛/2 − 1} ), Ra and Ra’ correspond to registers allocated for 
original instructions and duplicated instructions respectively. As 
mentioned above (e.g. Fig. 10), because we allow the instructions 
chosen by BMC to include load and store instructions, our approach 
can generate PLC checks, and can thus activate and detect bugs in 
uncore components as well as those in processor cores. 
E. Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V  
As detailed in Sec. II.C, the CFCSS-V QED transformation 
assigns unique software signatures to instructions or blocks of 
instructions. It then checks if each transition between instructions or 
blocks of instructions is valid. To implement CFCSS-V with 
Symbolic QED, a separate CFCSS-V module is added to the design 
to decode control flow instructions and determine the valid next 
instructions. Symbolic QED uses the memory address of an 
instruction (i.e., the memory location where the instruction resides) 
as its unique software signature. The CFCSS-V module decodes the 
memory addresses of the target instructions and stores them. The 
module then compares these memory addresses against the memory 
address of the next instruction to execute to determine if it is a valid 
instruction. The BMC tool is then asked to find a counter-example 
instruction trace that executes an invalid instruction. 
To implement CFCSS-V in a BMC tool, the property to be 
checked by the tool is: 
(currently_executing_PC==ADDRESS_branch) 
or 
(currently_executing_PC==ADDRESS_next),  
where currently_executing_PC is the memory address (i.e., the 
content of PC or program counter) of the instruction that the processor 
core is currently executing. For in-order processors, this corresponds 
to the PC of the instruction in the execution stage; for processors with 
out-of-order or speculative execution, this is the PC of the most 
recently committed instruction. The CFCSS-V module reads this 
instruction to decode its type and stores the appropriate 
ADDRESS_branch and ADDRESS_next values for control flow 
instructions. The instruction type (i.e., conditional branch, branch 
always, or non-control-flow altering instruction) is used as a select 
signal for a MUX that is used to determine what values (e.g., address 
of first instruction in the taken branch, address of first instruction in 
non-taken branch, or an increment of the PC) are used for 
ADDRESS_branch and ADDRESS_next. If the last executed 
instruction is a conditional branch instruction (determined by 
decoding the instruction), the ADDRESS_branch is the address of the 
first instruction in the taken branch (also obtained by decoding the 
instruction), and ADDRESS_next is the address of the first instruction 
in the not taken branch (usually an increment of the PC).  If the last 
executed instruction is a non-conditional branch instruction (branch 
always) both ADDRESS_branch and ADDRESS_next are assigned to 
the target address of the branch instruction. If the last executed 
instruction does not alter control flow (e.g., ALU instructions, load / 
store instructions), ADDRESS_branch is set to the same value as 
ADDRESS_next (usually it is an increment of the PC).  
Unlike EDDI-V and PLC, Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V doesn’t 
insert additional instructions. Hence, the Inst_min and Inst_max 
transformation parameters are not relevant. Symbolic QED for 
CFCSS-V requires the following input constraint: 
Inputs must be valid instructions 
(specifications of valid instructions can be 
directly obtained from the Instruction Set 
Architecture (ISA) of the processor cores).  
Since the BMC tool searches through all possible sequences of 
instructions for the input (including sequences of instructions that 
contain branch instructions), if one or more branch instructions are 
required to activate and detect a bug, the BMC tool will automatically 
find a bug trace that contains the necessary branch instruction(s) to 
violate the property as a counter-example. 
CFTSS-V tracks the control flow between blocks of instructions, 
and is extremely useful for deadlock / livelock situations. For bug 
localization during post-silicon validation, one may not necessarily 
need to use Symbolic QED for CFTSS-V.  This is demonstrated in 
[14], where QED family tests (with a range of different values for the 
Core 1
A  = STORE(R1)
R2 = R3 + R4  
R5 = LOAD(A)
BRANCH label 
Core 2
R2 = R3 – R4
R1 = LOAD(A)
R5 = LOAD(B)
Core 1
A  = STORE(R1)
R2 = R3 + R4  
R5 = LOAD(A)  // PLC load
A’ = STORE(R17)
R18= R19 + R20  
R21= LOAD(A’) // PLC load
BRANCH label 
Core 2
R2 = R3 – R4
R1 = LOAD(A)   // PLC load
R5 = LOAD(B)
R18 = R19 – R20
R17 = LOAD(A’) // PLC Load
R21 = LOAD(B’)
(a)	
(b)	
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Inst_min and Inst_max QED transformation parameters and different 
windows for the QED transformations) are sufficient to find a very 
short bug trace (e.g., 9 instructions in [14]).  However, Symbolic 
QED for the CFTSS-V QED transformation can be used to produce 
short bug traces during pre-silicon verification. In this context, 
deadlock is a situation during which signals in the processor core do 
not change, and the processor core does not make progress [33], so in 
our case it does not commit any instructions. During livelock, some 
signals in the processor core do change, but the processor core still 
does not make progress, and again in our examples it again does not 
commit any instructions. Note, we do not consider tests that contain 
self-loops (e.g., an infinite loop) to be livelocks.  
For Symbolic QED using CFTSS-V, we use the following 
property for BMC: 
F (number of committed instructions == C) 
This property states that eventually (i.e., F), the processor core has to 
commit C number of instructions. Note that the BMC tool would not 
attempt a trace of N+1 instructions without exhaustively trying all 
traces of N instructions. Thus, a counter-example to this property 
corresponds to a situation where the processor core is unable to 
commit C number of instructions (due to livelocks / deadlocks). The 
parameter C should be set as large as possible. However, since the 
design is analyzed in a BMC tool, which can only analyze a limited 
number of clock cycles (due to the size of the design), C is limited by 
the number of clock cycles the BMC tool can analyze.  For example, 
if a processor core can only commit 1 instruction every 2 clock cycles 
and the BMC tool can only analyze 10 clock cycles of the design, it 
is unreasonable to ask the BMC tool to find a situation where the 
processor core is unable to commit 1,000 instructions (i.e., C = 
1,000). Therefore, C corresponds to the number of instructions that 
the processor core can guarantee to commit in the given number of 
clock cycles analyzed by the BMC. The parameter C depends on the 
BMC tool used and the design being analyzed. For the OpenSPARC 
T2 processor core design, we determined that that the maximum 
number for C is 17 instructions for our BMC tool. C is obtained 
empirically. We start by setting C = 1, and analyze the design 
(including the QED module) with the CFTSS-V property. If the BMC 
tool is able to analyze the design (i.e., determine that the design can 
commit C number of instructions or produce a counter-example 
indicating that C number of instructions cannot be committed), then 
we increase C by 1.  We keep doing so until the BMC tool is unable 
to determine if C number of instructions can be committed or produce 
a counter-example after 50 hours. 
To keep track of the number of instructions that have committed, 
we add a small counter that counts the number of instructions 
committed (Fig. 11). This counter is only used within the BMC tool 
and is not added to the manufactured IC. The counter counts up by 1 
every time an instruction is committed, which is determined when an 
instruction commit signal from the commit stage of a processor core 
is active.  The output of the counter corresponds to the number of 
committed instructions (used by the property check by the BMC tool).  
The counter is reset to 0 at the start of BMC. 
Similar to Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V, we require the following 
constraints on the inputs. 
Inputs must be valid instructions (defined again 
by the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) of the 
processor cores). 
Symbolic QED for CFTSS-V may be combined with the 
Symbolic QED for EDDI-V, PLC and CFCSS-V. 
 
Figure 11. The counter for CFTSS-V. 
 
Figure 12. The partial instantiation approach for design reduction. 
 
 
Figure 13. OpenSPARC T2 diagram.  
F. Handling Large Designs 
A major challenge with BMC is handling large designs, which 
can significantly slow down a BMC tool or even cause it to fail while 
loading the design. A state-of-the-art commercial BMC tool may not 
be able to load a complete SoC (e.g., this is the case for OpenSPARC 
T2). However, it is not necessary to analyze an entire design at once 
using Symbolic QED. A key property of QED checks is that they are 
compositional, i.e., they are preserved across partial instances of a 
design (as long as there is one processor core in that instance). 
Symbolic QED handles large designs through partial instantiation, as 
described in the next section, a method that requires no hardware 
overhead and can be applied to any SoC design. 
We also discuss two further techniques (Core vs. Uncore 
Localization, Change Detectors) for helping handle such large 
designs if standard QED post-silicon validation tests are run before 
attempting to localize the bug. These techniques are not required, if 
Symbolic QED is used independently during pre- or post-silicon 
design stages. 
Partial Instantiation 
Partial instantiation works through two design reduction 
techniques. Technique 1 takes all components with multiple instances 
and repeatedly reduces their count by half until there is only 1 left. 
For example, in a multi-core SoC, the processor cores are removed 
from the design until there is only 1 processor core left. Technique 2 
removes a module as long as its removal does not divide the design 
into two disconnected components. For example, if a design has a 
processor core connected to a cache through a crossbar, the crossbar 
is not removed (without also removing the cache). This is because if 
the crossbar is removed, the processor core is disconnected from the 
cache. All possible combinations and repetitions of the two 
techniques are considered when producing candidates for analysis. 
Since we find bug traces in the form of instructions that execute on 
processor cores, each analyzed design must contain at least one 
processor core. Fig. 12 shows the steps for this approach. Once the 
full set of simplified (partially instantiated) designs is created, they 
can be analyzed by the BMC tool independently (in parallel). 
Consider the OpenSPARC T2 design with 8 processor cores, 1 
crossbar, 8 banks of shared L2 cache, 4 memory controllers, and an I/O 
controller (Fig. 13). This entire design is too big to be analyzed by the 
BMC tool, so it is not saved as a partial instance. One possibility is to 
remove the I/O controller, resulting in 8 processor cores, 1 crossbar, 8 
banks of cache, and 4 memory controllers; this is still too big for the 
BMC tool, and it is not saved as a partial instance. Alternatively, 
components with multiple instances (e.g., the cores, caches, and 
memory controllers) can be halved, reducing the design to 4 processor 
cores, 1 crossbar, 4 banks of cache, 2 memory controllers, and the I/O 
controller. This still does not fit in the BMC tool, and so again, it is not 
saved as a partial instance. At this point, we can take either of our two 
reduced designs as candidates for further reduction.  Let us consider the 
second one.  The crossbar is not removed, as it would disconnect the 
processor cores from the other components. Suppose instead that we 
apply technique 1 again. This reduces the design to 2 processor cores, 1 
crossbar, 2 banks of cache, 1 memory controller, and the I/O controller. 
This design still does not fit. Next, either the I/O controller or the 
memory controller can be removed through technique 2. By removing 
the I/O controller, we are left with 2 processor cores, 1 crossbar, 2 cache 
banks, and 1 memory controller.  This fits in the BMC tool and so the 
configuration is saved. Alternatively, by removing the memory 
controller, we are left with 2 processor cores, 1 crossbar, 2 cache banks 
and the I/O controller, which fits and is saved.  
Now, even though at this point we have two candidate 
configurations for BMC, we continue to apply design reduction 
Processor	cores	
Processor	cores	
Crossbar	
L2	
L2	 L2	
L2	L2	
L2	MCUs	 MCUs	
I
O
I
O
Processor	cores	
IO	
L2	
MCUs	
Crossbar	
Misc.	uncore	
Components	
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techniques to generate more partial instances.  The reason for this is for 
better localization: if BMC can find a bug trace in a smaller 
configuration, then this indicates that the components removed by the 
design reduction techniques are not necessary for activating and 
detecting the bug.  Continuing with the reduction, by applying technique 
1, the number of cores and caches can be reduced, resulting in 1 
processor core, 1 crossbar, 1 bank of cache, 1 memory controller, and 
the I/O controller. Further reductions result in smaller and smaller 
subsets of the design, each of which fits in the BMC tool and is saved. 
When no more reductions are possible (i.e., the design is reduced down 
to just a single core), all of the saved designs are analyzed independently 
(in parallel) by the BMC tool. 
Bugs Inside Processor Cores vs. Outside Processor Cores 
The partial instantiation technique can in some cases be 
improved if Symbolic QED is being used to further localize a bug 
found using traditional post-silicon QED. If a (standard, not 
symbolic) QED test fails either a Normal check or a Store check, we 
can immediately deduce that the bug is inside the processor core 
where the check failed.5  This is because, by design, Normal and Store 
checks catch any incorrect value produced by a processor core before 
it leaves the processor core and propagates to the uncore components 
or to other processor cores. Thus, we just need to perform BMC on 
the single processor core where the check failed in order to find a bug 
trace. If the test fails at a Load check or a PLC check, we cannot 
immediately infer where the bug is. For these cases, we would use the 
Partial Instantiation technique to simplify the design to be analyzed 
by BMC. 
Change Detectors for Design Reduction 
Symbolic QED does not require any additional hardware (e.g., 
trace buffers) to be added to the design. During post-silicon 
validation, however, Symbolic QED can be enhanced using a small 
amount of additional hardware to reduce the size of the design that 
the BMC tool must analyze. This hardware does require QED post-
silicon validation tests to be run first. We introduced small hardware 
structures, change detectors, to monitor signals between hardware 
blocks and record if changes occur within a sliding window of 
immediately preceding execution cycles (e.g. the last 1,000 cycles). 
When a QED test detects an error, if no signal changes are observed 
at the boundary of an uncore component (during the execution 
window being analyzed), then we exclude that component as a 
candidate contributing to the bug. This reduces the number of 
components for the BMC tool to analyze. Due to the short error 
detection latencies with QED (typically less than 1,000 cycles), the 
monitored sliding window can be small, reducing the area impact. 
The relative location and schematic for a change detector is 
shown in Fig. 14. The change detector is composed of a k-bit ripple 
counter that is initialized to its maximum value of all 1s and is reset 
to all 0s whenever a change in signal values is detected. It then begins 
up-counting increments each clock cycle until it is either reset again 
(to all 0s) because a change is detected, or it reaches and holds its 
maximum counter value, indicating no change was detected during 
the prior (2k-1) cycles. Due to the short error detection latencies of 
QED tests in [13,14], this time period does not need to be greater than 
a few thousand cycles (k≈10) to capture the bug activation and error 
propagation. We define this time period as the change window. When 
a QED test detects an error, the post silicon validation test stops and 
the change detector counter values are scanned out and saved. 
 
Figure 14. (a) Insertion of change detector around a flip-flop, and its 
schematic (b), where the k scan flip-flops acts as a k-bit up counter. 
 
5 The entire test must be transformed by QED for this to work.  If some QED checks are 
left out, then this cannot be guaranteed. For example, if some Normal checks and Store checks 
are omitted, an error caused by a bug inside the core may propagate to an uncore component.  
IV. RESULTS 
We demonstrate the effectiveness of Symbolic QED using the 
OpenSPARC T2 SoC [34] (Fig. 13), which is the open-source version of 
the UltraSPARC T2, a 500-million-transistor SoC with 8 processor cores 
(64 hardware threads), private L1 caches, 8 banks of shared L2 cache, 4 
memory controllers, a crossbar interconnect, and I/O controllers. We 
simulated logic bug scenarios from [13-15], which represent a wide 
variety of “difficult” bug scenarios that occurred in various commercial 
multicore SoCs.  The bug scenarios include bugs in the processor cores, 
bugs in the uncore components, and bugs related to power-management 
features.6 They are considered difficult because they took a long time 
(days to weeks) to localize. Note that, Symbolic QED does not rely on 
any information about the specific implementation of OpenSPARC T2, 
making it applicable to a wide variety of SoCs. 
We modified the RTL of the OpenSPARC T2 SoC to incorporate 
these bug scenarios. For the 80 bug scenarios from [13, 14], we set 
the bug scenario parameter X to 2 clock cycles and bug scenario 
parameter Y to 2 clock cycles. The details of X and Y are in [14]; note 
that smaller values for X and Y imply that the bugs are more difficult 
to activate and detect. For example, consider the activation criterion 
1 from [14]: “two stores within X clock cycles to different cache 
lines;” and two sequences of instructions: 1) {STORE [a], Rx; 
STORE [b], Ry} and 2) {STORE [a], Rx; MOV R0, 0; STORE [b], 
Ry}. While both sequence 1 and sequence 2 will satisfy the activation 
criterion when X=3 (i.e., two stores within 3 clock cycles to different 
cache lines), only sequence 1 will satisfy the activation criterion when 
X=2. For the 12 power management bug scenarios in [15], the 
activation criterion is set to a sequence of 5 instructions randomly 
selected from the original test, executed on a designated processor 
core. This is to emulate a power management controller which puts 
the system into a power-saving state when it executes a specific 
sequence of instructions. If a bug is inserted in a component, it is in 
all instances of that component.  
For BMC, we used the Questa Formal tool (version 10.2c_3) 
from Mentor Graphics on an AMD Opteron 6438 with 128GB of 
RAM. We added the QED module described in Sec. III.B to the RTL 
of the fetch unit in the OpenSPARC T2 processor core. The resulting 
fetch unit with the QED module was tested using Questa to ensure it 
correctly transforms a sequence of original instructions into a QED-
compatible bug trace. The testing process for 50 sequences of original 
instructions of varying lengths (1 to 10 instructions long) took 
approximately 1 minute of runtime. Moreover, we simulated all of 
the bug traces produced by Symbolic QED (which depends on the 
QED module) to ensure that they indeed activate and detect the 
corresponding bugs.  
A.  Effectiveness of Symbolic QED for Logic Bug Detection and 
Localization during Pre-silicon Verification  
The entries in Table 1 are categorized into processor core bugs, 
uncore bugs (bugs that are inside uncore components as well as in the 
interface between processor cores and uncore components), and power 
management bugs. “Bug trace length (instructions)” shows the 
[minimum, average, maximum] number of instructions in the bug trace. 
“Bug trace length (cycles)” represents the [minimum, average, 
maximum] number of clock cycles required to execute the bug trace. 
The two numbers are different because the number of cycles per 
instruction (CPI) is not 1 for all instructions (for example, a load or store 
instruction may take multiple clock cycles to execute). The reported 
length for bug traces corresponds to the number of instructions in the 
trace found by the BMC tool (not including duplicated instructions 
created by the QED modules). For bugs that are only found by executing 
instructions on multiple processor cores, the number of instructions for 
each core may be different. For example, one core could have a bug trace 
that is 3 instructions long, while another core has a bug trace that is 1 
instruction long. We report the length of the longest bug trace in such 
situations (3 in this example), as all cores must completely execute their 
corresponding instructions to activate and detect the bug (the cores 
execute instructions in parallel).  
We did not include any results from running BMC without 
Symbolic QED for three reasons: (i) the full design does not load into 
the BMC tool; (ii) even if it did, we would need properties to check 
6 Bug scenarios are in the appendix. The bug scenarios were simulated by modifying the 
RTL of the OpenSPARC T2 SoC design so that, for each bug scenario, if the bug activation 
criterion is satisfied, the bug effect is simulated.   
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Table 1. Symbolic QED results (initialized from a QED-consistent state 
obtained by running an FFT QED test) for “difficult” logic bug scenarios 
from [13-15], For bug traces, we report the [min., average, max.] length in 
instructions and clock cycles, plus the [min., average, max.] BMC runtimes. 
  Symbolic QED 
[min., average, max.] 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
o
r 
c
o
re
 o
n
ly
 Bug trace length (instructions) [3, 3, 3] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [13, 15, 16] 
BMC runtime (minutes) [22, 46, 90] 
Bugs detected and localized 100%* 
U
n
c
o
re
 Bug trace length (instructions) [3, 4, 4] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [14, 22, 29] 
BMC runtime (minutes) [78,164,188] 
Bugs detected and localized 100%* 
P
o
w
e
r 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
 Bug trace length (instructions) [5, 5, 5] 
Bug trace length (clock cycles) [17, 19, 22] 
BMC runtime (minutes) [205,266,333] 
Bugs detected and localized 100% 
to run BMC, and there is no clear way to create such properties (other 
than manual creation which would be subjective and extremely time-
consuming); (iii) some traditional design-specific assertions may 
quickly produce shorter counter-examples (vs. Symbolic QED) 
during pre-silicon verification for specific bugs in stand-alone design 
blocks targeted by the assertions. However, they can require 
significant manual effort (e.g., to create them, to model 
environmental constraints or to filter spurious counter-examples that 
cannot occur at the full system level) and they may miss bugs that 
would be caught by Symbolic QED (an example is presented in 
Appendix B of [35]). Indeed, the Symbolic QED technique for 
expressing a generic property to check is a key contribution. 
Observation 1: Symbolic QED correctly and automatically 
detects bugs during pre-silicon verification, and produces short bug 
traces for all bugs in less than 7 hours. Symbolic QED is effective for 
large designs such as the OpenSPARC T2, which are challenging 
when using traditional pre-silicon verification techniques. 
Symbolic QED also localized each of the bugs using the partial 
instantiation technique (Sec. III.F). The BMC tool analyzed the partial 
instances in parallel. For the OpenSPARC T2, there were 9 parallel 
BMC runs for each bug; each run corresponded to one of the following 
partial instances, which are ranked by size in descending order.7 1) 2 
processor cores, 2 L2 cache banks, and the I/O controller; 2) 2 processor 
cores, 2 L2 cache banks, and 1 memory controller; 3) 2 processor cores, 
and 2 L2 cache banks; 4) 1 processor core, 1 L2 cache bank, 1 memory 
controller, and the I/O controller; 5) 1 processor core, 1 L2 cache bank, 
and the I/O controller; 6) 1 processor core, 1 L2 cache bank, and 1 
memory controller; 7) 1 processor core and the I/O controller; 8) 1 
processor core, 1 L2 cache bank; and 9) 1 processor core. Recall that if 
a bug is in a component, it is in all instances of the component. For these 
bugs, the BMC runtime reported corresponds to the runtime of the 
smallest partial instance that produced a counter-example. For example, 
for a given bug, if both partial instances 6 and 8 produced a counter-
example, then only the result from partial instance 8 was reported. This 
example reveals that the additional components in partial instance 6 
were not required for activating or detecting the bug.  Specifically, for 
this example, while both partial instances 6 and 8 contain processor 
cores and caches, partial instance 8 does not have a memory controller. 
Thus the memory controller was not required to activate and detect the 
bug. Note that this partial instance provides a small candidate list of 
components that may contain the bug. 
Observation 2: Symbolic QED correctly localizes bugs and 
provides a list of components corresponding to possible bug locations.  
Figure 15 reports a breakdown of the bugs localized by Symbolic 
QED, which correctly localized all 92 bugs. Symbolic QED using 
partial instantiation (Sec. III.F) localized 26.1% the bugs to exactly 1 
processor core; for 56.5% of the bugs, Symbolic QED localized the 
bug to 1 processor core, 1 L2 cache bank and the crossbar that 
connects the two; and for 17.4% of the bugs, Symbolic QED localized 
the bug to 2 processor cores, 2 L2 cache banks, and the crossbar that 
connects the components. 
 
7 Partial instantiation 1 is the largest that will fit into the BMC tool; all designs also 
contain the crossbar that connects the components together. 
 
Figure 15. Pie chart showing the percentage breakdown (by list of 
candidate modules) of 92 bugs correctly localized by Symbolic QED. 
 
Figure 16. The BMC runtimes for Symbolic QED. 
 
The BMC runtimes reported in Table 1 use the QED-consistent 
initial state constraint discussed in Sec. III.B. In Fig. 16, we report 
three runtimes for each bug: the runtime when starting from the state 
immediately after a reset sequence (which is QED-consistent in this 
case), the runtime when starting from a QED-consistent initial state 
obtained by running the FFT QED test and seeding BMC with the 
resulting register and memory values (Sec. III.B), and the runtime 
when similarly seeding BMC after running MMULT. Results show 
that using a QED-consistent initial state obtained by running a QED 
test improves runtimes by up to 5X compared to starting from the 
state immediately after a reset sequence. No significant differences 
were observed between the results from using the FFT test and those 
using the MMULT test. 
 
B.  Effectiveness of Symbolic QED for Post-silicon Validation 
Here, we consider the scenario when Symbolic QED is not used 
during pre-silicon verification; and, bugs escape and get detected 
during post-silicon validation. To compare Symbolic QED against 
post-silicon validation tests, we used the EDDI-V and the PLC (Sec. 
II) QED transformations to transform an 8-thread version of the FFT 
test (from SPLASH-2 [36]) and an in-house 8-thread version of the 
matrix multiplication test (MMULT) into QED tests to detect bugs. 
The Inst_min and Inst_max QED transformation parameters were set 
to 100, a setting which typically allows bugs to be detected within a 
few hundred clock cycles (as shown in [12-14]).8 Trying additional 
tests (beyond FFT and MMULT) was deemed unnecessary because 
both tests (after QED transformation) were able to detect all 92 bugs 
(and Symbolic QED is independent of other tests that detect the bug). 
The results are summarized in Table 2. The Original (No QED) 
column shows results for the original validation tests (FFT or MMULT) 
using end-result-checks (that check the results of the test vs. pre-
computed, known correct results). The QED column shows results from 
running the same tests after applying QED transformations. Note that, 
unlike Symbolic QED, both the Original (No QED) and the QED tests 
(without the techniques discussed in Sec. III.F) are only able to report 
the existence of a bug; they cannot localize the bug (i.e., determine if the 
bug is in any of the uncore components, or is caused by interactions 
between the components); nor can they determine very precisely how 
the bug is activated. For the post-silicon tests, each entry contains two 
sets of numbers, corresponding to results obtained from the FFT test 
(top), and results obtained from the MMULT test (bottom).  
Observation 3: Symbolic QED automatically produces bug 
traces that are up to 6 orders of magnitude shorter than traditional post-
silicon validation tests that rely on end-result-checks, and up to 5 orders 
of magnitude shorter than QED tests. Symbolic QED did not require 
any trace buffers (or any additional hardware) to produce correct 
bug traces. 
 
8 These Inst_min and Inst_max parameters do not affect the bug traces found by Symbolic 
QED shown later; they are only used to create the QED tests for detecting bugs. 
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Table 2. Results comparing original tests (No QED) and QED tests for FFT 
(top values) and MMULT (bottom values) with Symbolic QED (initialized 
from a QED-consistent state obtained by running an FFT QED test). For 
bug traces, we report the [minimum, average, maximum] length in 
instructions and clock cycles. We also report [minimum, average, 
maximum] BMC runtimes. 
  Original  
(No QED) 
QED Symbolic 
QED 
P
ro
c
e
s
s
o
r 
c
o
re
 
o
n
ly
 
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
[643,551k,4.9M] 
[12k,534k,2.3M] 
[324,57k,233k]† 
[421,67k,321k]† 
[3, 3, 3] 
 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
[842,572k,5.1M] 
[15k,544k,2.5M] 
[367,66k,265k] † 
[522,69k,272k] † 
[13, 15, 16] 
 
Coverage 50.0% 
54.2% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A [22, 46, 90] 
 
Bugs localized 0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100%* 
  
U
n
c
o
re
 
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
[620,1.6M,9.8M] 
[1k,536k,2.5M] 
[231,59k,232k] † 
[392,80k,421k] † 
[3, 4, 4] 
 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
[722,1.9M,11M] 
[2k,550k,2.7M] 
[292,72k,289k]† 
[442,95k,435k]† 
[14, 22, 29] 
 
Coverage 55.3% 
57.1% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A [78,164,188] 
  
Bugs localized 0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100%*  
  
P
o
w
e
r 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t 
 
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
[1.5k,236k,495k] 
[963,213k,422k]  
[10k,68k,302k]† 
[1k,47k,134k]†  
[5, 5, 5] 
 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
[1.9k,251k,512k] 
[1.5k,220k,430k] 
[13k,75k,319k]† 
[2k,49k,149k]† 
[17, 19, 22] 
 
Coverage 66.7% 
66.7% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A [205,266,333] 
 
Bugs localized 0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
100%* 
 
* Symbolic QED localizes 100% of the bugs without using trace buffers.  
† If trace buffers are used for QED, then the trace lengths in terms of instructions 
are: for FFT, [63, 451, 863] for processor core bugs, [29, 487, 832] for uncore 
bugs, and [42, 297, 742] for power management bugs; and for MMULT, [44, 
309, 874] for processor bugs, [32, 502, 884] for uncore bugs, and [67, 392, 742] 
for power management bugs. The trace lengths in terms of clock cycles are: for 
FFT, [82, 512, 922] for processor core bugs, [38, 532, 930] for uncore bugs, and 
[66, 412, 912] for power management bugs; and for MMULT, [69, 420, 921] for 
processor core bugs, [58, 582, 944] for uncore bugs, and [79, 482, 801] for 
power management bugs. Other entries remain the same. 
 
These are very difficult bugs that took many days or weeks of 
(manual) work to localize use traditional approaches (also evident by the 
long bug traces produced by traditional techniques). Short bug traces 
make debugging much easier. A more detailed visualization of the trace 
lengths for each bug scenario is presented in Fig. 17. 
With the techniques described in Sec. III.F, standard QED can 
localize processor core bugs. And in our experiments, as expected, 
QED tests detected all processor core bugs by either a failing Normal 
check or a failing Store check, both of which indicate that the bug 
must be inside a processor core (this was determined solely based on 
the type of the failing QED check, not because we knew which bugs 
were being simulated). However, QED fails to provide any 
localization for uncore bugs. Symbolic QED, if used after QED, can 
use the information obtained from QED to avoid having to use partial 
instantiation in the case when QED has already localized the bug to a 
processor core. In Table 2, “Coverage” is the percentage of the 92 
bugs detected. Both Symbolic QED and QED detected all 92 bugs, 
while the original tests detected only a little more than half of the 
bugs. This is because original tests (No QED) may not contain the 
instructions needed to activate a bug, and even if they do, there may 
not be sufficient checks to detect it.  
 
Figure 17. Trace length (in terms of number of instructions). 
Table 3. Results comparing original tests (No QED) and QED family tests 
(CFCSS-V) for FFT (top values) and MMULT (bottom values), and 
Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V (initialized from a QED-consistent state 
obtained by running an FFT QED test). For bug traces, we report the 
[minimum, average, maximum] length in instructions and clock cycles. We 
also report [minimum, average, maximum] BMC runtimes in minutes. 
 
  Original 
(No QED) 
QED  
(CFCSS-V) 
Symbolic QED 
(CFCSS-V) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
fl
o
w
 
b
u
g
s
  
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
[643,321k,1.2M] 
[12k,319k,1.1M] 
[14,39k,91k]† 
[14,38k,66k]† 
[3, 3, 4] 
 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
[781,620k,2.2M] 
[14k,619k,2.1M] 
[22,37k,77k] † 
[22,38k,69k] † 
[13, 15, 16] 
 
Coverage 62.5% 
62.5% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A [19, 39, 71] 
 
† If trace buffers are used for QED, then the trace lengths in terms of instructions are: 
for FFT with CFCSS-V [14, 92, 231], MMULT with CFCSS-V [14, 120, 192]. The trace 
lengths in terms of clock cycles are: for FFT with CFCSS-V [22, 112, 265], MMULT 
with CFCSS-V [22, 141, 222]. Other entries remain the same. 
Table 4. Results comparing original tests (No QED) and QED family tests 
(CFTSS-V) for FFT (top values) and MMULT (bottom values), and 
Symbolic QED for CFTSS-V (initialized from a QED-consistent state 
obtained by running an FFT QED test). For bug traces, we report the length 
in instructions and clock cycles. We also report the BMC runtime in 
minutes. 
 
  Original 
(No QED) 
QED 
(CFTSS-V) 
Symbolic QED  
(CFTSS-V) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
fl
o
w
 b
u
g
 
th
a
t 
re
s
u
lt
s
 i
n
 a
 
d
e
a
d
lo
c
k
 
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
~12B 
~12B 
9 
9 
9 
 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
12B 
12B 
19 
19 
19 
 
Coverage 100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
100% 
 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A 72 
 
 
C.  Effectiveness of Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V 
Transformations (for both Pre-silicon and Post-silicon validation)  
 
To evaluate Symbolic QED for CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V, we 
implemented bug scenarios from [14] (Table A1 of the Appendix) 
that affect the control flows of processor cores.  Specifically, bug 
activation criteria 1-8 from Table A1.A and bug effect H from Table 
A1.B in the Appendix were implemented.  In addition, we also 
implemented the bug from the case study presented in [14], i.e., a 
deadlock occurs when a specific sequence of 9 instructions (from the 
original test) are executed. The deadlock is implemented by stopping 
the pipeline of processor core so that the processor core does not fetch 
new instructions and does not commit instructions already in the 
pipeline. The bugs were implemented by modifying the RTL of the 
OpenSPARC T2. For Symbolic QED for CFTSS-V, we set C = 17 to 
get the property: “eventually, 17 instructions have to commit”. As 
discussed in Sec. III.E, we empirically selected C = 17, the largest 
number of instructions the BMC tool could successfully analyze. 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of Symbolic QED for CFCSS-
V and CFTSS-V, respectively. Since CFCSS-V QED targets bugs 
that result in incorrect control-flow and not livelocks / deadlocks, 
Table 3 only reports results corresponding to the 8 bug scenarios that 
result in incorrect control-flow (i.e., bug activation criteria 1-8 from 
Table A1.A and bug effect H from Table A1.B).  Since CFTSS-V 
targets bugs that results in livelocks / deadlocks, Table 4 only reports 
results corresponding to the bug (described above) that results in a 
deadlock. Note that, the Symbolic QED results apply to pre-silicon 
verification as well (as in Table 1).  
 Observation 4: Symbolic QED correctly localizes control flow 
bugs in under 80 minutes and provides traces up to 6 orders of 
magnitude shorter than traditional post-silicon validation tests, and up to 
5 orders of magnitude shorter than QED tests. These results include a 
bug that caused a deadlock.  
Since both CFCSS-V and CFTSS-V target bugs that affect the 
control flows of processor cores, only the processor core was 
analyzed in the BMC tool. The Original (No QED) column shows 
results from running the original validation tests (FFT or MMULT) 
using end result checks to check the results of the test against pre-
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computed, known correct results.  For the bug scenario that resulted 
in a deadlock (Table 4) we used a timeout of 10 seconds to detect if a 
deadlock occurred.  Since the OpenSPARC T2 is designed to operate 
at 1.2 GHz, this corresponds to an error detection latency of 12 billion 
clock cycles.   
Although none of the bug scenarios demonstrated explicitly 
simulate processor interrupt related bugs, the inclusion of CFCSS-V 
and CTCSS-V also enables Symbolic QED to detect and localize 
most interrupt related bugs. When an interrupt occurs, the processor 
branches to a pre-determined section of code to respond to the 
interrupt, and then branches back to continue executing from where 
it left off [36]. Note, therefore, that most processors executing an 
interrupt behave similarly to a processor executing any branch 
instruction followed by some code and then another branch back to 
the same location in the original code. As a result, a bug during the 
processor interrupt can have the following effects. The processor may 
execute the wrong code during the interrupt or it may return to the 
wrong place in the original code. Both of these cases are characterized 
by the branch to wrong address scenario that is already included in 
our bug examples. The results in Table 3 demonstrate that Symbolic 
QED for CFCSS-V correctly detects and finds traces for these types 
of bugs. Interrupt bugs can also cause the system to hang during the 
interrupt’s execution in a deadlock or livelock which would be 
covered by the CFTSS-V implementation of Symbolic QED (Sec. 
III.E). The results in Table 4 again demonstrate the ability of this 
approach to detect and find instruction traces to localize these bugs. 
D.  Effectiveness of Symbolic QED for Bugs with Very Long 
Activation Sequences 
Some logic bugs can be difficult to activate, because they require 
a specific state that can only be reached by executing a long sequence 
of specific instructions (far beyond the BMC bound) or starting the 
BMC analysis from a specific rather than generic initial state. Such 
bugs may escape pre-silicon verification, and require extensive 
testing using QED tests for detection during post-silicon validation. 
Symbolic QED helps localize such difficult bugs (after detection 
during post-silicon validation using QED tests). The key idea is to use 
the “state” of the design at an “appropriate” point (e.g., prior to or 
immediately after bug detection by QED) as an initial state for 
Symbolic QED.  
To illustrate our approach, we consider three bug scenarios in 
Table 5. Each activation criterion in Table 5.A requires long 
sequences. A previously described bug effect from [13, 14] is shown 
in Table 5.B. Using a generic (QED-consistent) initialization, 
Symbolic QED initially failed to find a trace (i.e., the BMC tool timed 
out) for all three bugs (e.g., during pre-silicon verification). A QED-
transformed MMULT benchmark with Inst_min and Inst_max set to 
50 detected all three bugs (during post-silicon validation). However, 
the QED test cannot localize these bugs. As discussed in Sec. III.F, 
QED can localize a bug to a processor core (if it is detected by a 
normal or store check). However, bugs detected by a load check can 
come from any other module in the entire design. For the bug 
examples shown in this section, the bug effect results in an outdated 
cache entry (due to a dropped invalidate signal) in the L2 cache.  
Based on QED results obtained during post-silicon validation, 
two different strategies can now be used to initialize the BMC tool 
for Symbolic QED. 
Strategy 1. This method uses QED-consistent values obtained 
from running QED tests to initialize flip-flops corresponding to 
architectural states (register values and memory contents). We make 
some (minor) modifications to QED tests for this purpose. First, we 
instrument the QED test with the CFTSS-V QED transformation 
from Sec. II.C (along with other QED transforms such as EDDI-V to 
quickly detect bugs).  
 
Table 5.A. Activation criteria requiring very long activation sequences. 
Processor 
Core  
1. R registers must each contain a specific value V. 
2. A specific sequence of N instructions must execute within X 
cycles. 
3. A specific cache state. 
Table 5.B.  Bug effect from [13, 14]. 
Uncore Component Next received cache coherence message dropped 
 
 
  Transformed Code  
        ... 
SIGNATURE = BLOCK_X 
<CFTSS-V Operation> 
R1  = R2  + R3 
R4  = R5  – R6 
R7  = R1  – R4 
R4  = R7  * R8 
R17 = R18 + R19 
R20 = R21 – R22 
R23 = R17 – R20 
R20 = R23 * R24 
SIGNATURE = BLOCK_Y 
<CFTSS-V Operation> 
        ... 
(a) 
 
 
CFTSS-V Operation 
For Thread N 
 
CFTSS_V_SIG_COUNT_N++ 
IF (CFTSS_V_SIG_COUNT_N == STOP) 
 { 
   GOTO END 
 } 
 
(b) 
 
 
Figure 18. CFTSS-V transformed code (a) inserted before each block of 
instructions with Inst_min = Inst_max = 4; and (b) pseudo-code for 
incrementing a count of CFTSS-V signatures and checking if the stopping 
point has been reached, on thread N.  
 
Next, we enhance the tests to additionally count the total number 
of CFTSS signature updates, SE (Fig. 18), that have been performed 
by each thread. The number of signature updates provides a rough 
estimate of when the bug was detected during test execution. Finally, 
we also add a check that stops execution of a thread if its signature 
count reaches some value STOP.  The reason for this check is 
explained later, but it is included in the test from the beginning so that 
the tests do not need to be modified later. Each thread has its own 
signature variable and corresponding signature count. CFTSS-V 
signatures are inserted at QED-consistent points in the test (where the 
architectural state is QED-consistent, Sec. III.C). 
We run the QED test (using the modified CFTSS-V plus other 
error detecting transforms, e.g., EDDI-V) initially with STOP set to 
0 (to ensure that the STOP condition is not triggered; the signature 
count associated with the first CFTSS-V check starts at 1).  When the 
test detects a bug, the values of each thread’s CFTSS-V signature 
counts are saved. Next, the post-silicon QED test is rerun, but this 
time with each thread’s STOP value set to the CFTSS-V signature 
counts from the run that detected the bug. Note that, this run (to obtain 
the architectural states) does not require failure reproduction (i.e., the 
bug to be detected again). It is even possible that for some 
pathological cases, the STOP condition will not be reached on a 
thread (e.g., if the signature update count was only reached due to the 
thread’s behavior in the presence of the bug). Our general assumption 
is that, near each thread’s final signature update the design’s 
architectural state is “close” to the one required to activate the bug.  
After having rerun the test to each thread’s STOP condition, the 
BMC tool is initialized with the final values in the registers and 
memory. Symbolic QED is then used to find a bug trace starting from 
this architectural state.  It is possible that the bug activation occurred 
before this state (as shown in the following example) and that this 
final state once again requires too long of an instruction sequence for 
the BMC tool to find a bug trace. One can decrement the CFTSS-V 
signature counts of one or more threads in that case to initialize 
Symbolic QED to an earlier state in an attempt to find a trace from 
there. Multiple different initializations can be tried in parallel. 
For example, consider a scenario using the first activation 
criterion in Table 5.A with R = 30 and V = -1, and the bug effect in 
Table 5.B. Since 30 instructions would be required to load the given 
value into 30 registers to activate this bug, Symbolic QED cannot find 
a trace with a generic initialization. During our 8-core QED 
transformed MMULT post-silicon test, an EDDI-V check detected an 
error, after which we stopped the QED test and read out the CFTSS-
V signature counts for each core (one thread per core). The QED test 
detected an error after counting the following CTFSS-V signature 
updates on the cores: 1,501, 1,463, 1,471, 1,466, 1,475, 1,468, 1,472 
and 1,470. To find the architectural states (register and memory 
values) at each saved signature count, we re-ran the QED test and 
saved the architectural state on each core after those signature counts.  
For each partial instance, we initialized the BMC tool with the 
register and memory values from the saved architectural states and 
then ran Symbolic QED. The BMC tool timed out with this first 
attempt for each of the partial instances. We then proceeded to search 
through earlier architectural states by decrementing the signature 
update count of a thread and re-running the QED test to find that 
architectural state. Symbolic QED successfully found a bug trace 
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with a partial instantiation of 2 cores, the crossbar and 2 cache banks 
when initialized with an architectural state corresponding to the 
following CFTSS-V signature update counts on the cores: 1,499 
(instead of 1,501 earlier) on Core 1 and 1,463 on Core 2. This 
example provides an important insight. The MMULT QED test 
immediately loaded new register values after the bug was activated – 
by the time the error was detected, the architectural state of the design 
had changed significantly. Between bug activation and detection, the 
error(s) in the internal flip-flop(s) was (were) not yet observable at 
the architectural state level. Hence, with the initialization 
corresponding to CFTSS-V signature update counts obtained upon 
bug detection, Symbolic QED timed out.  
However, when initialized with an architectural state 
corresponding to “slightly” earlier CFTSS-V signature update 
count(s), twenty-seven of the registers on Core 1 already contained -
1, and Symbolic QED could activate the bug by deriving instructions 
that write -1 to the remaining three. Symbolic QED could also derive 
instructions that detected the error (well within the BMC bound).  
With Strategy 1, it is possible that the BMC tool may time out 
because a bug requires too many instructions to be activated with only 
the architectural states initialized. In such cases, we use Strategy 2.  
Strategy 2. Strategy 1 initializes BMC with architectural states 
only. It is possible that internal flip-flops and/or caches may have to 
be correctly initialized for BMC to find a solution within BMC 
bounds. In these cases, we rely on RTL simulation to generate logic 
values of internal states for BMC initialization. (High-level 
simulators such as SIMICS [38] or gem5 [39] may also be used for 
faster simulation speeds, but the internal states visible to such tools 
can be limited.) Given the complexity of existing designs, simulating 
the system from the start of the QED test is impractical. Instead, we 
initialize each thread at the start of the simulation to a QED-consistent 
architectural state. That architectural state for each thread can be 
obtained from the CFTSS-V signature counts, as in Strategy 1.  
The purpose of RTL simulation is to resolve internal flip-flop 
values of the system (ideally leaving none as unknown or Xs). Each 
RTL simulation starts from the power on reset state, after which the 
registers and memory values of each thread are set to the desired 
architectural state from the selected CFTSS-V signature update. 
During simulation, each thread then executes the remaining code that 
followed the chosen signature update on that thread. Starting from the 
power on reset state reduces the occurrences of internal Xs (unknown 
states). We observed from 1,000 RTL simulations of our QED-
transformed MMULT test, our QED-transformed FFT test, and a test 
composed of randomly generated instructions (each starting from a 
random architectural state on all 8 cores) that nearly all Xs were 
resolved in the OpenSPARC T2 SoC after 1,000 cycles. The Xs that 
remained were limited to invalid data array values such as in the L2 
cache eviction control logic, where the write-back array contains Xs 
until a modified entry exists in the L2 cache to be written to memory. 
These Xs should not propagate within the design as their entries 
would not be accessed unless they were overwritten by a valid value.  
This suggests that it should be sufficient to run the RTL 
simulation for at least 1,000 cycles on each thread, after the initial 
reset sequence. One way to ensure this is to start RTL simulation from 
an architectural state corresponding to 1,000 CFTSS-V signature 
updates before the final one. For our examples, this meant closer to 
100,000 cycles of RTL simulation; the total simulation time was still 
under forty minutes (Table 6). We perform RTL simulation up to 
certain CFTSS-V signature count values for each thread (the specific 
values are determined similar to Strategy 1). At the end of RTL 
simulation, we save the full design state (e.g. a VCD file), and use 
this state to initialize the BMC tool. The BMC tool then attempts to 
find a bug trace (through partial instantiation). We assume that multi-
threaded applications do not need to be “perfectly” synchronized to 
derive the initial state for BMC.  
Table 6: Runtime (minutes) simulating the entire OpenSPARC T2 RTL for 
a given number of CFTSS-V signature updates on each of the 8 cores, 
starting each core from a QED-consistent register and memory initialization 
from a MMULT benchmark transformed with EDDI-V, PLC and CFTSS-V. 
Signature Updates 100 200 500 1,000 
Runtime (min.) 6 10 21 38 
 
 
Multiple threads running in parallel are unlikely to reach QED-
consistent states (and update CFTSS-V signatures) simultaneously. 
Thus, it is likely that the exact sequence of operations will be different 
during RTL simulation vs. post-silicon test (e.g., shared variables 
may be updated in different orders). Similar to Strategy 1, we assume 
this strategy brings us “close” to the design state that triggers the bug. 
We now return to the discussion of our three examples. We 
already discussed the first example using activation criterion 1 from 
Table 5.A. Our second bug example uses activation criterion 2 from 
Table 5.A with N=25 and X=30 and the bug effect in Table 5.B. The 
activating sequence of 25 instructions is too long to be detected by a 
generic Symbolic QED initialization or Strategy 1 (as mentioned in 
Sec. III.E, our BMC tool could not analyze instruction sequences 
beyond 17 instructions). The 8-core QED-transformed MMULT test 
(with Inst_min and Inst_max set to 50) detected the error after 
counting the following CTFSS-V signature updates: 3,736, 3,684, 
3,691, 3,693, 3,690, 3,688, 3,686 and 3,691. For Strategy 2, we reran 
the test and stopped at the following signature update counts: 2,736, 
2,684, 2,691, 2,693, 2,690, 2,688, 2,686 and 2,691 (1,000 updates 
prior to bug detection). We captured the architectural state at this 
point to initialize RTL simulation. We then simulated the full RTL 
through 1,000 signature updates on each core to reach the final 
signature update counts above. We used the full design state at this 
point to initialize the BMC tool for Symbolic QED. Using a partial 
instance consisting of one processor core (Core 2), the crossbar and 
two cache banks, the BMC tool returned a one-instruction bug trace, 
loading an entry from the L2 cache to Core 2. Significantly, this trace 
could be repeated by initializing Cores 3 through 8 in the partial 
instance but could not be obtained using Core 1. Analyzing that 
instruction trace with Core 1 resulted in the correct entry being loaded 
from Core 1’s L1 cache. This suggested that the corrupted entry 
loaded by the other Cores was correctly saved in Core 1’s L1 cache, 
indicating a bug involving the L2 cache system. Searching through 
earlier initializations (by stopping RTL simulation at earlier signature 
update count(s)), this same trace propagating the error from the L2 
cache could be found only when Core 1 was simulated to one of its 
last two signature update counts (i.e. either 3,735 or 3,736).  
This (correctly) indicated that the bug was activated after 
signature update 3,734 (within the 100 instructions preceding 
signature update count 3,735, determined by Inst_min/Inst_max of 
the QED test). At this point, additional debugging effort would be 
required to narrow the activation sequence even further.  One 
potential approach we plan to explore in future work would be to take 
small subsets of these 100 instructions and simulate both an original 
and a corresponding duplicate copy of them and use the resulting 
(QED-consistent) state to initialize Symbolic QED.  
Our third bug example used activation criterion 3 from Table 5.A 
(also with the bug effect in Table 5.B) and required all of the L1 cache 
lines to be valid. It also could not be activated by the BMC tool using 
Strategy 1, as expected, since it requires a specific cache state. The 8-
core MMULT QED test detected the bug after reaching the following 
signature update counts: 2,273, 2,241, 2,243, 2,236, 2,247, 2,239, 
2,243 and 2,240. For Strategy 2, we loaded the RTL simulator with 
the architectural state corresponding to signature update counts: 
1,273, 1,241, 1,243, 1,236, 1,247, 1,239, 1,243 and 1,240. We then 
ran RTL simulation up to the final signature update counts and 
initialized the BMC tool with that design state. Symbolic QED, using 
a partial instantiation of one core, the crossbar and two L2 cache 
banks returned a one-instruction trace, loading from the L2 cache to 
the core. Similar to bug example 2 (and as expected since this 
example used the same bug effect), the trace could only be found 
using Cores 2 to 8 but could not be found using Core 1. The bug trace 
was only produced when Core 1 reached one of its final four signature 
update counts, starting at 2,270. This (correctly) localized the bug’s 
activation to the 100 instructions between signature updates 2,269 
and 2,270 on Core 1. 
Observation 5: The results in Table 7 show that, with a 
combination of QED post-silicon tests and Symbolic QED, it is 
possible to localize each of the very long activation sequence bugs 
with an activating instruction trace and a partial instantiation in under 
60 minutes. Significantly, for these bugs, QED tests alone cannot 
provide this degree of localization.  
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Table 7. Results for bugs with long activation sequences: comparing 
original MMULT test (No QED), QED tests (EDDI-V, PLC), Symbolic QED, 
and QED tests (EDDI-V, PLC, CFTSS-V) followed by initialized Symbolic 
QED. For bug traces, we report the length in instructions and clock cycles 
for a bug using each activation criterion [1, 2, 3] in Table 5.A. We similarly 
report BMC runtimes for each in minutes. Bug activation criterion 1 used 
Strategy 1; criteria 2 and 3 used Strategy 2. 
 
Original 
(No 
QED) 
QED 
(EDDI-V, 
PLC) 
 
Symbolic 
QED 
QED followed by 
Symbolic QED 
(initialized using 
Strategies 1 & 2) 
Bug trace length 
(instructions) 
[2.1M] 
[217, 170, 
354] 
[N/A] [5, 1*, 1*] 
Bug trace length 
(clock cycles) 
[2.4M] 
 
[260, 192, 
426] 
[N/A] [22, 5, 6] 
Coverage 0% 100% 0% 100% 
BMC runtime 
(minutes) 
N/A N/A (Timeout) 
[55, 42, 47] 
 
Bugs Localized 0% 0% 0% 100% 
*1-instruction Symbolic QED trace to load the error after the bug has been 
activated through initialization from RTL simulation (Strategy 2). 
 
 
Figure 19. Change detector reduced design results for 92 bugs activated 
during the FFT and MMULT benchmark tests. 
E.  Usefulness of Change Detectors during Post-silicon Validation 
To gauge the usefulness of the change detectors in reducing the 
design size, we used the same 92 bug scenarios in OpenSPARC T2 
and ran the QED transformed (EDDI-V and PLC) FFT benchmark 
along with a QED transformed (EDDI-V and PLC) matrix 
multiplication (MMULT) benchmark. With a change window of 
1023 cycles, we observed that for these benchmarks, only the 
processor cores, crossbar, L2 caches and memory controllers were 
part of the reduced design. Other components such as the I/O modules 
and data management unit were removed from the design. For the 92 
bugs, as shown in Fig. 19, the number of L2 caches (L2C) and 
memory controllers (MCU) also varied. However, only for 3 of the 
bugs (using the FFT benchmark) was the design size reduced enough 
to completely eliminate one set of these modules (the memory 
controllers) from the partial instantiation designs. We performed 
synthesis using Synopsys Design Compiler with the Synopsys EDK 32 
nm library to calculate the area overhead of the change detectors on 
OpenSPARC T2 SoC.  
Observation 6: We inserted change detectors on 1,067 signals with 
a total of 24,214 bits, thus requiring 24,214 change detectors for the 
entire design. This resulted in a 1.86% chip-level area overhead. 
However, given that the change detectors did not reduce the number of 
memory controllers or caches enough to eliminate a partial instantiation 
design for most of the bugs (Fig. 19), in this example we can remove the 
change detectors that only observe signals between these components. 
The number of signals monitored then drops to 899, removing several 
large data buses and requiring only 12,734 bits to be monitored. The area 
overhead now reduces to 0.98%. Thus the partial use of change 
detectors, generally on peripheral components that see intermittent 
activity, appears to be cost-effective; monitoring components such as 
caches and memory controllers that have high switching activity does 
not add significant value. The overhead is significantly less than the 4% 
overhead of reconfigurable logic for post-silicon debugging [7].  
Furthermore, this approach avoids using trace buffers [11, 24, 38- 40]. 
V. RELATED WORK 
The Symbolic QED technique in this paper mostly leverages 
prior work from QED [12, 13, 14], but there are important 
differences. Unlike Symbolic QED, QED alone does not directly 
localize bugs at a fine level of hardware granularity. As shown in Sec. 
IV, the bug traces obtained by QED can be very long (up to 5 orders 
of magnitude longer when no trace buffers are used) compared to 
Symbolic QED. Furthermore, Symbolic QED can be used during 
both pre-silicon and post-silicon, while QED is only an approach for 
a post-silicon validation. For bugs inside processor cores, Symbolic 
QED may be further enhanced by techniques such as self-consistency 
checking [43]. However, [43] addresses only processor core bugs. 
Our experience with bugs in commercial SoCs indicates that uncore 
components are an important source of difficult bugs [13, 14, 15].  
The growing importance of post-silicon validation and debug has 
motivated recent publications on bug localization and bug trace 
generation. IFRA and the related BLoG [41, 42] techniques for post-
silicon bug localization target processors only and the published 
results target electrical bugs. Their effectiveness for bugs inside 
uncore components is unclear. They also require manual efforts and 
additional hardware, unlike Symbolic QED.  
Many post-silicon bug localization approaches rely on trace buffers 
and assertions. Sec. I discussed the inadequacy of these techniques (some 
of the heuristics for trace buffer insertion, e.g., restoration ratio and its 
derivatives, only work for logic bugs, since they use simulations to 
compute the logic values of signals that are not traced). In contrast, 
Symbolic QED doesn’t require any trace buffers (or any additional 
hardware) or design-specific assertions and provides a very succinct and 
generic property to quickly detect and localize logic bugs. 
BackSpace and its derivatives [24, 11, 12] provide a concrete 
bug trace once an error is detected or the system crashes by using 
formal methods to stitch together multiple short traces (or system 
states) into a longer trace. Some BackSpace derivatives require 
failure reproduction, which, as discussed in Sec. I and in [16, 22], is 
challenging due to Heisenbug effects [45]. nuTAB-BackSpace 
addresses some of the failure reproduction challenges but requires 
design-specific “rewrite rules” to determine if two similar states are 
equivalent. These rewrite rules have to be manually crafted by 
designers and require designer intuition, which may be difficult for 
large designs.  Furthermore, the bug traces found may be very long, 
and unlike Symbolic QED, these techniques cannot reduce the length 
of the bug traces. Moreover, techniques that rely solely on formal 
methods for bug localization (e.g., [24, 11, 12, 25]) are not scalable 
to large designs (e.g. OpenSPARC T2). Some formal techniques 
require specific bug models (e.g., [25] which targets a specific model 
for electrical bugs) and may not work for logic bugs, since it is 
difficult to create models for all logic bugs [43]. 
Approaches that rely on detailed RTL simulations to obtain the 
internal states of a design are not scalable for large designs because 
full system RTL-level simulation of large designs is extremely slow, 
less than 10 clock cycles per second [23]. [46] presented a technique 
for post-silicon bug diagnosis, but it requires multiple detailed RTL 
simulations of the internal states of a design to guide the insertion of 
hardware structures for debugging. BuTraMin [38] is a pre-silicon 
technique for shortening the length of a bug trace. For use in post-
silicon validation and debug of large designs, it requires massive 
simulations to capture logic values of all flip-flops in the system, 
which will be difficult. There may be opportunities to use such 
techniques after Symbolic QED localizes bugs and produces short 
bug traces (as demonstrated in this paper).  
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Symbolic QED technique presented in this paper is a new 
structured and automated approach for logic bug detection and 
localization. It can be used to debug the design at any stage, both pre- 
and post-silicon. It detects logical bugs and provides a list of 
components that may contain the bugs along with the shortest 
instruction trace to activate the bug. Symbolic QED produces bug 
traces that are up to 6 orders of magnitude shorter than traditional 
post-silicon validation tests that rely on end-result-checks, and up to 
5 orders of magnitude shorter than QED. It is completely automated, 
and does not require human intervention or additional hardware. 
Symbolic QED is both effective and practical, as demonstrated on 
the OpenSPARC T2, where it correctly localized difficult logic bug 
scenarios that occurred during post-silicon validation of various 
commercial multicore SoCs.  These difficult bug scenarios originally 
took many days or weeks of (mostly manual) debug work to localize. 
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Other formal techniques for debugging may take days or fail completely 
for large designs such as the OpenSPARC T2. As demonstrated in this 
paper, Symbolic QED is effective for bugs inside processor cores, bugs 
inside uncore components, as well as bugs related to power-management 
features and even bugs with long activation sequences. Symbolic QED is 
applicable to any SoC design if it contains at least one programmable 
processor core (a generally valid assumption for existing SoCs [3]). 
There are several directions for future work.  Symbolic QED can 
be expanded to: 1) demonstrate its ability to detect and localize bugs 
during pre-silicon or emulation-based verification; 2) localize electrical 
bugs during post-silicon validation (this paper’s focus was on logic 
bugs); 3) perform full system-level bug localization; 4) perform 
diagnosis of manufacturing defects during system-level testing; 5) 
localize bugs in analog and mixed signal components; 6) investigate its 
applicability to software verification using an approach similar to [28]; 
7) use a more general QED module that does not require all processor 
cores to start execution on the same cycle and starts duplication on a 
pseudo-instruction “QED” (instead of a control-flow instruction) and 
8) use systematic techniques for initializing Symbolic QED during pre-
silicon verification to further target bugs activated by long instruction 
sequences and difficult to reach design states (often only detected 
during post-silicon validation).  
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APPENDIX 
A bug scenario is formed by pairing one bug activation criterion with one bug effect. 
Table A1.A. Bug activation criteria from [13, 14]. 
Uncore 
components  
1. Two stores within X clock cycles to different cache lines. 
2. Two stores within X clock cycles to the same cache line. 
3. Two stores within X clock cycles to adjacent cache lines. 
4. Two cache misses within X cycles. 
5. A sequence of loads and/or stores within X clock cycles. 
Processor 
cores 
6. Data forwarding between pipeline stages. 
7. Two branch instructions within X clock cycles. 
Other 8. A randomly chosen clock cycle. 
Table A1.B.  Bug effects from [13, 14]. 
Uncore 
components 
A. Next received cache* coherence message dropped. 
B. Next received cache* coherence message delayed. 
C. Next store operation not allocated a cache* line. 
D. Next store update to cache* delayed by Y clock cycles. 
E. Next data accessed from cache* corrupted. 
F. Next data coming from main memory to cache* / core* corrupted. 
G. Processor core’s* load value corrupted. 
Processor 
cores 
H. Core* jumps to incorrect (random) address in the next cycle. 
I. Error in decoding next instruction’s operand inside core*. 
J. Processor core* incorrectly decodes next instruction to a NOP instruction. 
* Where activation criterion is satisfied.  
Table A2.A. Power management bug activation criterion [15]. 
ID Description 
1 When exiting from power-saving state. 
 
Table A2.B. Power management bug effects [15]. 
Type ID Description 
Uncore 
components 
A The value of the next load operation from data cache is corrupted to all 
0’s. 
B Next load operation from data cache delayed (1 clock cycle) by cache 
controller. 
C Data cache drops the next load operation. 
D The value of the next load operation from main memory is corrupted to all 
0’s. 
E Next load operation from main memory delayed (1 clock cycle) by 
memory controller. 
F Next load request to main memory is dropped. 
G Next load operation is delayed for 1 clock cycle by the interconnection 
network. 
H Next load operation is corrupted to all 0’s by the interconnection network. 
I Next load operation is dropped by the interconnection network. 
Processor cores J Processor jumps to a random address. 
K Next instruction is corrupted to NOP 
L The value of the next register read is corrupted to all 0’s. 
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